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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX
REVISITED
Steven A. Bank*
FAIR NOT FLAT: How TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND

By Edward J. McCaff�ry. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 2002. Pp. xiii, 178. $28.

SIMPLER.

·

Over the last decade, it has become increasingly evident that our
current federal income tax is too complex, too easily evaded by the
wealthy, and too likely to distribute the burdens of taxation to the
people least able to bear it. Several years ago, frustration with these
realities led to a groundswell of reform proposals, ranging from
replacing the current graduated income tax rates with "flat," or
proportionate, rates to abolishing the income tax altogether in favor of
a national sales tax. 1 While this tax reform frenzy dissipated almost as
quickly as it began, the seeds of discontent remain.
Professor Edward McCaffery2 seeks to revive the tax reform de
bate in Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler.
In his book, the University of Southern California law professor pro
poses combining elements of both the flat tax and sales tax proposals
of the mid-90s.3 The twist in his proposal is that he abandons the flat
rate that most politicians and commentators erroneously characterized
as the most significant innovation of the flat tax. The flat rate always
concealed the more radical proposal to exempt savings and investment
from the tax base. McCaffery should be commended for highlighting
this feature and acknowledging its true significance. In doing this,
however, he forgoes the flat tax's rhetorical appeal by explicitly
embracing the introduction of progressivity through graduated rates.
The proposal is therefore unique in the politically charged world of tax
reform because it combines features that should be appealing to
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. B.A. 1991 , University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1994,
University of Chicago. - Ed. Thanks to Bill Klein, Katherine Pratt, and Kirk Stark for help
ful comments and suggestions.

1. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1996)
[hereinafter Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax] (describing the eight proposals that were either cir
culated or formally submitted to Congress during 1995).
2. Maurice Jones Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California; Visiting Pro
fessor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology.
3. This is not McCaffery's first enunciation of the idea. See Edward J. McCaffery, The
Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233, 248-51 (1999); Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX AS L. REV. 1145 (1992).

2238

May 2003)

The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited

2239

members of both ends of the spectrum. For liberals, it embraces the
progressive ideal of the modern income tax. For conservatives, it fully
exempts savings and investment from taxation and therefore operates
as a consumption tax. It appears to be the perfect compromise - a
progressive consumption tax.
While McCaffery's plan is unique, it is not unprecedented. There
have been at least three serious attempts to persuade Congress to
adopt some form of a progressive consumption tax. In 1921, during
consideration of the first post-World War I revenue act, Representa
tive Ogden Mills of New York introduced a bill to replace the income
surtaxes with a "graduated spendings tax."4 Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau revived Mills's proposal in 1942 by proposing to combine
a refundable war-time tax with a permanent graduated surtax on
spending.5 Finally, during the latest round ·Of radical tax reform pro
posals in 1995, Senators Sam Nunn, Pete Domenici, and Bob Kerrey
introduced a bill to replace the income tax with the Unlimited Savings
Allowance ("USA") Tax, a measure McCaffery discusses (p. 57-58),
and which was recently reintroduced in modified form.6
There are significant similarities between each of these attempts to
introduce a progressive consumption tax - similarities that may pro
vide important lessons for the fate of McCaffery's plan. Each time a
progressive consumption tax was proposed, there was substantial
dissatisfaction with the complexity of the income tax and there was
already support for proposals to adopt a consumption tax. Moreover,
many contemporary scholars supported the progressive consumption
tax during each period. Notwithstanding such seemingly favorable
conditions for the adoption of a progressive consumption tax, each
proposal was summarily rejected.
This Review considers why the progressive consumption tax has
never been embraced. While the prior rejections were in part a result
of their unique circumstances, there are several common themes. In
each instance, opponents complained that the progressive consump
tion tax failed to reduce the complexity characterizing the current
income tax. Furthermore, proponents miscalculated the source of
opposition to the progressive consumption tax. First, they failed to
understand that consumption tax proponents were committed to a flat
rate sales tax. Second, they underestimated the support for an income
tax base by those who supported graduated rates. Instead of finding a
compromise between the two positions, proponents of the progressive
consumption tax alienated both sides. Given such problems, it is not

4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part Il.C.
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surprising that the proposals received little more than passing consid
eration.
Although McCaffery's plan is a vast improvement, there is little
reason to believe that it would fare better than its predecessors. Com
promises are often difficult in the context of radical reform. The pro
gressive consumption tax, however, may be an illusory compromise.
Part I describes McCaffery's proposal. Part II provides a brief history
of the progressive consumptio'n tax and three instances in which it was
unsuccessfully proposed. Part III discusses why McCaffery's proposal
is also unlikely to be adopted and Part IV concludes by suggesting an
alternative compromise.
I.

THE PROPOSAL

McCaffery's proposal combines a flat sales tax with a supplemental
graduated tax on consumption. Under the sales tax component, every
one would be subject to either a national retail sales tax or a value
added tax ("VAT") at a uniform ten percent rate.7 To exempt con
sumption on necessities, McCaffery proposes a credit that would effec
tively refund the sales tax paid for the lowest bracket of consumption
(p. 101). This credit is analogous. to the exemptions and standard
deduction under current law. Using the numbers he provides for illus
tration purposes, a family of four would pay no tax on their first
$20,000 of expenditures, and only a ten percent national sales tax on
the next $60,000 spent (pp. 100-01). For families who spend more than
$80,000 annually, a supplemental tax would be imposed at rates start
ing at ten percent and rising to as much as fifty percent.8
McCaffery defines "consumption" as the amount remaining after
deducting all savings and investment from a taxpayer's income. As
McCaffery explains, in an ideal income tax system, income is defined
as consumption plus accumulation, or, expressed algebraically, I C +
A (pp. 11-12). This "Haig-Simons" definition of income, named after
=

7. P. 100. A sales tax would be imposed at the point of retail sale while the value added
tax would be imposed at each point in the manufacture and sale of a product in which value
is added by the seller.
·

8. P. 101. The actual rates would be as follows:

Spending
0-20,000
20,000-80,000
80,000-160,000
160,000-500,000
500,000-1,000,000
over 1,000,000
P. 91 tbl.5.5.

Rate (%)
0
10
. 20
30
40
50
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the professors who derived it,9 can also be used to define consumption.
Under this formulation, C I
A, or consumption is income minus
accumulation. In other words, if an income tax exempts savings and
investment, it becomes a consumption tax .
. This allows McCaffery to use the current system in implementing
his proposal. Each taxpayer would have something akin to an individ
ual retirement account, which McCaffery calls a "Trust Account," to
represent the amount saved or invested (p. 98). Contributions to the
Trust Account would be deducted from income and withdrawals
would be included in income. Loaris would also be included in income,
although they would be deductible if contributed to a Trust Account.
Conversely, debt repayment, including interest, would be deductible
as a form of investment. Under McCaffery's simplified formulation,
"Taxable Consumption" would consist of W-2s (wages) plus what he
calls "D-2s" (debts) minus what he calls "S-2s" (savings) and some
currently deductible items such as medical expenses and charitable
contributions (p. 98). McCaffery would also abolish the estate and gift
tax. As he puts it, "[d]ead people don't spend" (p. 63). Instead, the
heirs would be taxed when they spend.
=

-

. II. TH E PRECEDENTS
The progressive consumption tax concept is not a new one in
either academic or political thought. On at least three occasions in the
last century, an influential legislator or Treasury itself introduced the
idea as an alternative to heavy reliance on the income tax. In each
instance, despite many contemporary scholars' backing, the proposal
was dismissed with little debate.
A. 1921 '
The end of World War I brought demand.for radical reform of the
tax system. While the income tax helped to meet wartime revenue
demands, the cessation of hostilities revealed its defects. As Thomas S.
Adams, a Yale economics professor and special advisor to the
Treasury wrote in August 1921, "[p]lainly there is 'something the mat
ter with the income tax.' About the necessity of thoroly [sic] revising
the income tax law at this session of Congress there is general agree
ment. "10 Both Democrats and Republicans called for tax reform,
9. See HENRY c. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
As A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (photo. reprint 1980) (1938); Robert Murray Haig,
The Concept of Income- Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7
(Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921).
10. See Internal-Revenue Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong. 45 (1921) [hereinafter S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue
Act of 1921] (brief of the Trades Council of the Manufacturers' Club of Philadelphia); Tho-
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perhaps in part motivated by widespread dissatisfaction with the tax
among businesses and the public.11 The House Ways and Means and
the Senate Finance Committees each "received thousands of letters"
expressing "a demand for revision."1 2
In this call for tax reform, there was substantial pressure to adopt a
national sales tax to replace the excess profits tax and the high
surtaxes on individual income. A variety of groups supported the sales
tax concept, including the Business Men's National Tax Committee,
the Tax League of America, and the New York Board of Trade; and
prominent business leaders such as Otto Kahn, Jules Bache, and
Charles E. Lord joined them in their efforts.13 Sales tax proponents .
understood the need for an income tax during the war, but as Lord
explained in a speech to the National Industrial Conference Board:
[t]he emergency ... is past and we should promptly discard a theory of
taxation which is both so uncertain and working so many evil results, and
should seek a method which will be surer in its incidence, more equitable
in its operation [and] simpler in its collection .... Can such a way be
found? Certainly; as soon as we commence to tax what people spend in
stead of what they save, we are on the right road.41

Congress was receptive to the sales tax concept. During the hear
ings before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Revenue
Act of 1921, Republican Alanson Houghton of New York asked:
Would you put a tax on a man who by saving increases the total funds of
investment money in the country and so develops business, industry, and
farming, or would you put the burden on the man who spends it on flow
ers, in yachting, and a thousand and one ways that do not produce a
permanent increase in revenue?15

To Houghton and others, the answer was obvious: place the burden on
the wasteful spender.
The sales tax concept gained support in the Senate as a way to
replace the revenue from the excess profits tax and high surtax rates in
mas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q. J. ECON. 527, 528
(1921).
1 1 . ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 190 (1940).
12. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of I92I, supra note 10, at 22 (statement of
Sen. Boies Penrose, Chairman); James A. Emery, Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX CONFERENCE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 9, at 4, 5 ( 1 920) (herein
after PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX CONFERENCE].
13. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 11, at 190; RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 128 (1954).
14. Charles E. Lord, Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TAX
CONFERENCE, supra note 12, at 45, 49.
15. Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
67th Cong., 86 (1921) [hereinafter House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision] (statement
of Rep. Houghton), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 19091 950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).

May 2003]

The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited

2243

operation during the war. On April 12, Senator Reed Smoot (R-UT)
introduced a measure for a temporary sales tax 1 6 that was referred to
the Senate Finance Committee for further discussion.17 The controver
sial nature of this proposal was evident during the ensuing hearings.
Almost fifty individuals or groups, nearly evenly divided for and
against, testified on the general concept of a sales tax. Their testimony
consumed more than four hundred and fifty pages of the official
record and took place over several weeks.18 Proponents argued that a
general sales tax was simpler to administer and relieved the inequita
ble burden imposed on higher incomes under the income tax.19 While
opponents generally conceded the need for reform, they argued that
the sales tax was a regressive levy imposed not in accordance with an
individual's ability to pay. 2 0 In a vote divided along party and regional
lines, Smoot's proposal was eventually defeated in Committee by only
one vote.2 1
As a compromise, Representative Ogden Mills, a Republican from
New York, proposed a graduated rate "spendings tax." 2 2 According to
Mills, because of the high surtax rates on individual income, evasion
had "demoralized the whole system" both by significantly eroding the
tax base and by reducing liquid capital.2 3 Moreover, because it would
be passed on to the consumer, a general sales tax would impose a
significant burden "on the shoulders of those least able to bear it, that
is, the people of moderate incomes who have to spend the major part

16. 61 CONG. REC. 151 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot). A companion bill authored by
Representative Isaac Bacharach (R-NJ) was introduced in the House. See Prepare to Press
for Tax on Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1921, at 1.
17. 61 CONG. REC. 151 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot).
18. See S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10.
19. See, e.g., id. at 56 (statement of C.H. Smith, Chairman, Tax Comm., Nat'! Ass'n of
Mfrs.) (urging a sales tax on grounds of simplicity and convenience); id. at 77 (brief of Tax
League of America) (stating that the sales tax "is characterized by simplicity, equity, capac
ity to produce the needed revenue, economy of administration, and the very essential quality
of honesty").
20. See, e.g., id. at 360 (statement of Walter W. Liggett, Comm. of Mfrs. and Merchs. of
Chicago) ("[W]e consider the proposed Smoot sales-tax bill one of the most iniquitous
measures that has ever been devised. We consider that the Smoot sales tax bill is a step
backward to the days of the Roman empire . . . ."); id. at 412 ("I am fearful, therefore, lest
we find ourselves saddled with a great new tax machine, a tax which is inherently unjust in
that it is a tax on consumption. a tax which bears more heavily on the poor than on the
rich . . . . ) .
"

21. JOHN F. WITIE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
90 (1985).
22. See House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 144 (statement
of Rep. Mills); see also Spendings Tax Plan Proposed by Mills, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1921,
at
.
18.
23. House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 153 (letter from
Rep. Mills).
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of those incomes for the necessities of life."24 Mills suggested that a
graduated spending tax offered a middle ground between these two
alternatives. Under Mills's plan, individuals would be permitted to
deduct from income all amounts saved and invested, plus amounts
spent on certain necessities, including medical care and charitable
contributions. A tax would be imposed at a rate of one percent for
every $2,000 spent above a $2,000 exemption, up to $18,000, and one
percent every $1,000 spent thereafter up to $50,000.2 5 Amounts
expended in excess of $50,000 would be taxed at a forty percent rate.2 6
According to Mills, the graduated spendings tax "can fairly claim the
virtues of the sales tax, being in effect a tax on money spent for
consumption, without being regressive in character or laying a dispro
portionate burden on those least able to bear it ...."2 7 It "combines
the advantages of the sales tax, and yet maintains the principles
underlying our tax system."28
While the graduated spendings tax was backed by scholars such as
Thomas Adams and businessmen such as Macy's president Jesse
Straus, 2 9 it was summarily rejected by the House Ways and Means
Committee.30 Those who advocated retaining the high surtax rates and
the excess profits tax on corporations viewed the progressive con
sumption tax as an affront to the principle of ability to pay.3 1 Repre
sentative William Stevenson (D-S.C.) asked,
I wonder how he [Mills] would think a man like the late Russell Sage was
bearing his part of governmental expenses when he was drawing his mil
lions and living on $60 a month or thereabouts, and all of that exempt
under the plan of Mr.Mills?...I understand very well why he is in favor
of this bill. It is because it cuts down the income taxes, it cuts down the
big corporate income taxes, it cuts down enormously where he is inter
ested.32

Mills's use of existing evasion as a rationale for a progressive con
sumption tax was equally unpersuasive. As Representative John C.
Box (D-Texas) commented, "[t]his bill [Mills's graduated spendings
tax] proposes to relieve the men who have done these things [evade
24. Id. at 153 (letter from Rep. Mills).
25. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills).
26. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills).
27. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills).
28. Id. (letter from Rep. Mills).
29. See Adams, supra note 10, at 537-40; Expects Price Cuts to Increase Prices, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1 920, at 26 (reporting that Macy's president proposed a graduated expendi
tures tax in a speech to the Economic Club).
30. See 61 CONG. REC. 5138 ( 1921) (statement of Rep. William Green (R-Iowa)).
31. 61 CONG. REC. 5141 ( 1921 ) (statement of Rep. James Frear (R-Wis.)).
32. 61 CONG. REC. 5232 ( 1 921 ) (statement of Rep. Stevenson).
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taxes], in large part at least, because they have done them.... This bill
proposes not merely to favor the rich, but the guilty rich, the criminal
rich." 3 3
Mills's plan fared no better with sales tax proponents because it
embraced the principle of graduated taxation.3 4 One Senator sup
ported a manufacturer�s sales tax because it would "strike down the
vicious principle of graduated taxation," which he argued was "but a
modem legislative adaptation of the Communistic doctrine of Karl
Marx." 3 5 The Tax League of America, a group formed to lobby for the
sales tax, argued: "[a]bolish the income tax altogether or abolish the
surtaxes and make it a flat tax, and many difficulties disappear." 3 6
Because the spendings tax preserved this element of the existing sys
tem, it fundamentally failed to appeal tO supporters of a sales tax.
Further damaging Mills's plan in the eyes of both groups was the
belief that it failed to deliver either the simplicity of the retail sales tax
or the relative familiarity of the income tax. The retail sales tax not
only promised to reduce reliance on the complex income tax, but it
would permit the government to combine all sales taxes into one gen
eral sales tax.37 By contrast, the spendings tax appeared complex
to contemporary observers. As Representative Stevenson asked,
"[p]ut into effect the proposition to tax according to what a man
spends and graduate it according as he spends it, and the United States
Government will have to have an auditor behind every man in the
country who has any money to spend. How would you ever carry it
out?" 38 For Stevenson and others, the untested nature of the proposal
made it difficult to accept Mills's reassurances that it "is not any more
complicated" than under existing law.3 9

33. 61 CONG. REC. 5233 (1921) (statement of Rep. Box).
34. Sales tax supporters did appear to approve of some progressivity in the form of an
exemption. See, e.g., S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 , supra note 10, at 170
(statement of Carlos B. Clark, National Retail Dry Goods Association) (proposing $2,500
exemption for singles and $5,000 exemption for heads of household).
35. PAUL, supra note 13, at 128 (quoting Senator Moses) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
36. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10, at 90 (brief of Tax
League of America).
37. See id. at 46 (brief of the Trades Council of the Manufacturers' Club of Philadel
phia).
38. 61 CONG. REC. at 5232 (1921) (statement of Rep. Stevenson).
39. See, e.g., House Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision, supra note 15, at 150 (state
ment of Rep. Mills); id. (statement of Rep. Frear) ("! can see many objections, at least, they
occur to me. Has any tax expert in the United States, or elsewhere, ever adopted or sug
gested that plan?"); 61 CONG. REC. 5138 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green) (stating that the
proposed spendings tax "will work a perfect revolution in our form of taxes, and the commit
tee was afraid to undertake it at this time").
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1942

As the 1930s came to a close, scholars once again argued that the
existing income tax system needed to be "radically reformed. "40 While
experts differed as to whether this reform should move the income tax
closer to a consumption or accretion tax, 41 advocates of both "agree[d]
that either system would be an improvement over the present system
or lack of system."42 Notwithstanding this agreement, the push for
radical tax reform did not take place until the country entered World
War II. The motivating force was the need to curb rampant inflation
and consumer spending.
The shift of manufacturing capacity from consumer to military
goods created an acute scarcity problem. 43 Workers were earning
more, but they had less to buy. Instead of simply doing without, they
spent more, driving up prices. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau
announced that "unnecessary spending . . . is now reaching boom
proportions and . . . is threatening to drive the cost of living to heights
which will affect every American home."44 Beyond just affecting the
cost of living, inflation threatened the country's ability to finance the
war itself. 45 While administrative rationing was utilized for select
goods, by far the preferred method of rationing was through the price
mechanism. 46 The sales tax was one method of dampening consumer
spending through increased prices. President Roosevelt had consis
tently opposed a sales tax during the Depression and advocated using
lowered exemptions and higher surtax rates to control spending in the
Revenue Act of 1941. 47 When this was rejected, however, he admitted
in his January 1942 Budget Message that "[i]n the face of the present
financial and economic situation . . . we may later be compelled to
reconsider the temporary necessity of" a sales tax. 48 Prominent mem40. Irving Fisher, The Double Taxation of Savings, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 16, 17 (1939).
41. See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL L. REV. 1, 4451 (2000) [hereinafter Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism ] .
.

42. Fisher, supra note 40, at 17.
43. See W. Allen Wallis, How to Ration Consumers' Goods and Control Their Prices, 32
AM. ECON. REV. 501, 501 (1942).
44. Edward Ryan, Morgenthau Again Asks Spendings Tax, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1942,
at 8.
45. See C.P. Trussell, Morgenthau Demands Tax on Spending to Stop 'Boom,' N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1942, at 1.
46. Wallis, supra note 43, at 501.
47. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
91 (1996).
48. See Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Sales Tax
Controversy (Mar. 17, 1942) [hereinafter The Sales Tax Controversy), in Papers of Roy
Blough, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Box 44 [hereinafter Blough Papers), avail
able at http://www.tax.orgffHP/Civilization/Documents/Sales/hst6647/6647-1 .htm (last vis-
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bers of the administration lined up with Congressional Democrats in
backing a retail sales tax.49
As a compromise, 5 0 Treasury proposed a progressive consumption
tax similar to the one offered by Mills in 1921.5 1 The progressive
feature both mitigated the inequities of the sales tax and "attach[ed] a
penalty to spending that became more severe as spending increases."5 2
According to a Treasury staff memorandum, "[p]rogressive rates
make it possible to enact a spendings tax that will make spendings in
excess of any desired amount prohibitively costly. This is impossible
under a sales tax without at the same time levying an intolerable
burden on the great masses of the people."5 3
After receiving the go-ahead from Senator Walter George (D
Ga.), chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 5 4 Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau introduced his progressive spendings tax proposal
to the entire Committee on September 3, 1942.5 5 According to
Morgenthau, the purpose was "to reduce consumer spending directly
by withdrawing funds otherwise available for expenditure, and to
reduce it also indirectly by creating a strong tax incentive to saving."5 6
According to Randolph Paul, general counsel to Treasury, the spend
ings tax had two components.57 The first was a flat rate tax of ten perited Aug. 25, 2003). The country faced a similar problem during World War I, but academics
argued that a significant rise in the marginal rates would curtail unnecessary spending. See
STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 322 (2002).
49. BROWNLEE, supra note 47, at 92-93.
50. Id. at 93 ("Morgenthau, on the recommendation of Randolph Paul and Roy Blough,
tried to bridge the gap between the administration and Congress by proposing the adoption
of a graduated spendings tax . . . . ).
"

51. See Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Proposal for a
"Consumption Expenditure Tax" (July 9, 1942), in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6,
available at http://www.tax.org/THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9369/9369-1.htm
(last visited Apr. 30, 2003). The Department of the Treasury had been studying this proposal
since at least the spring of 1942. See The Sales Tax Controversy, supra note 48.
52. Memorandum, Div. of Tax Research, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Comments on the
Proposal for a Spendings Tax (July 29, 1 942) [hereinafter Comments on the Proposal for a
Spendings Tax], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6, available at http://www.tax.org/
THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9370/9370-1.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003); see
B ROWNLEE, supra note 47, at 93; PAUL, supra note 13, at 293.
53. Comments on the Proposal for a Spendings Tax, supra note 52.
54. See Memorandum from Roy Blough, to the Secretary of the Treasury, (Aug. 27,
1 942) [hereinafter Blough Memorandum], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6 (describ
ing a meeting between Secretary Morgenthau, Roy Blough, Randolph Paul, and Senator
George), available at http://www.tax.org/THP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9371 /
9371-1.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). According to Blough, "Senator George indicated that
he thought the principle of a spendings tax had much to recommend it. " Blough Memoran
dum, supra.
55. Morgenthau's Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 16.
56. Id.
57. See Randolph E. Paul, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement Be
fore the S. Finance Comm., Executive Session in Support of the Recommendations of the
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cent on spendings for consumer goods and services.58 This would be
collected at the source through income tax withholding and credited at
the end of the year to the extent that the difference between income
and savings or investment, plus an exemption amount, did not equal or
exceed the ten percent tax on spending.5 9 At the end of the war, the
amount collected through this tax would be gradually refunded.6 0 As
the New York Times reported, this aspect of the proposal was effec
tively "enforced savings . . . without interest." 6 1 The second component
was a spendings surtax imposed at progressive rates on expenditures
in excess of $1,000. 6 2 The surtax rates ranged from twenty percent on
spending under $2,000, to seventy-five percent on spending over
$10,000. 6 3 Rather than using the withholding mechanism, this tax
would be collected by requiring taxpayers to report their spendings, or
the difference between their income and their savings, and pay the tax
due on that level of expenditure. 6 4 This tax would not be refunded
after the war.
As in 1921, many scholars and businessmen supported the Treas
ury proposal. Irving Fisher, a professor of economics at Yale who
advocated for a consumption tax throughout his career, 6 5 was consid
ered "instrumental" in the development of the Treasury proposal. 6 6
According to Fisher, the income tax subjected savings and investment
to double taxation and therefore constituted a deterrent to expan
sion. 67 He contended that not only could Treasury's proposed progres
sive consumption tax curtail spending and stem the inflationary tide, it
could eventually replace the income tax altogether.68 This recommenSecretary of the Treasury for an Additional War-Time Revenue Program (Sept. 3, 1942)
[hereinafter Paul Testimony], in Blough Papers, supra note 48, Box 6, available at
http://www. tax.orgffHP/Civilization/Documents/Spending/hst9367 /9367-1.htm.
58. Paul Testimony, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. John MacCormac, Spending Tax Gets a Cool Reception; Sales Levy Urged, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 1 .
62. Randolph Paul Testimony, supra note 57.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See IRVING FISHER & HERBERT w. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 3-5 (1 942); cf Irving Fisher, Are Savings Income?, 9 AM. ECON.
ASS'N Q. 21 , 24 (1908) (contending that savings should be excluded from the definition of
income, leaving, therefore, only consumption); Irving Fisher, The Role of Capital in Eco
nomic Theory, 7 ECON. J. 511, 532-33 (1897) (same).
66. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 12 (1955).
67. Revenue Act of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 77th
Cong. 2166 (1942) [hereinafter S. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942] (statement of Irving
Fisher, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Yale University) .
68. Id. at 2164, 2171 (statement of Irving Fisher).
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dation echoed the one made by industrialist C. William Hazelett, 69
who argued that graduating the consumption tax rate could create an
"excess living standards" tax akin to the excess profits tax employed
against corporations.7 0 Under the progressive consumption tax,
Hazelett explained, "we define income as what it really is. There is no
economic income but the living standard of the taxpayer."7 1
Notwithstanding this support,. the progressive consumption tax
proposal fell flat on its face. It was called "Morgenthau's morning
glory - It opened Tuesday morning and it folded before noon. "7 2 The
New York Times reported Treasury's proposal "met a cold reception
from the Senate Finance Committee,"7 3 while the Washington Post
reported the proposal "created a near sensation, " followed by a
"hostile committee reaction."7 4 The day after it was introduced, one
Senator declared "[t]he pla_n is dead. Not a man on the committee is
for it."7 5 Following a few days of heavy lobbying, Morgenthau
attempted to reintroduce the spendings tax proposal,7 6 but neither the
Senate nor the House included it in its version of the bill.77
As Treasury initially feared, the graduated spendings tax proposal
only served to open the door for proponents of a retail sales tax.78
"After a full morning passed in expounding [on] the spending tax, "79
several members of the Senate Finance Committee demanded that

69. Id. at 929 (statement of C. William Hazelett). Hazelett had previously testified be
fore the Senate Finance Committee about using taxation to encourage investment in gov
ernment bonds and to penalize "idle" money. See Survey of Experiences in Profit Sharing
and Possibilities of Incentive Taxation: Hearings on S. Res. 215 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong. (1938); see also c. WILLIAM HAZELETT, INCENTIVE

TAXATION: A KEY TO SECURITY (1939).
70. S. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 67, at 934 (statement of C. Wil
liam Hazlett).
71. Id. (statement of C. William Hazlett).
72. Robert C. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1942, at 83 [hereinafter
Albright, Gallery Glimpses].
73. MacCormac, supra note 61, at l.
74. Robert C. Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury in Place of Spending Tax Plan,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1942, at 1 [hereinafter Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury].
75. MacCormac, supra note 61, at 1 (quoting Sen. Joseph Guffey (D-Pa.) (internal quo
tation marks omitted)); see Treasury Charts Effect of Surtax on One Group, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1942, at 16 ("The chorus of opposition to the Treasury's spending tax plan among
members of the committee was almost without a dissenting note.").
76. Ryan, supra note 44; Trussell, supra note 45.
77. Morgenthau Asks Stiffer Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1942, at 12.
78. See Taxes Are Eased on Scarce Metals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1942, at 15. Despite
Treasury's reluctance on the sales tax, one reporter commented "he [Morgenthau] had a
[sales tax] plan ready," suggesting that Treasury conceded the political support for the sales
tax despite its preference for the graduated spendings' tax proposal. See Albright, Gallery
Glimpses, supra note 72.
79. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, supra note 72:
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Randolph Paul return in the afternoon to provide an alternative
Treasury proposal for a sales tax.8 0 One complaint was the complexity
of the spendings tax proposal. As Paul explained, this was the dilemma
for Treasury: "When a new revenue proposal is presented in general
terms, congressmen want to know how it will be implemented. When
the particulars of a proposal are immediately offered, the mass of
detail makes it seem too complicated."8 1 Treasury chose the latter
route and paid the price. Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.) called it "the
most complicated and unworkable that has been submitted by tax
experts to the Senate Finance Committee in the nine years of my
membership. It has all the evils and none of the virtues of a sales
tax."8 2 Senator Bennett Champ Clark (D-Mo.) echoed such concerns,
branding it "[t]he most complicated monstrosity I've seen."8 3 A second
problem appeared to be the graduated rates. Given the later adoption
of a "Victory tax, " which contained elements of the spendings tax
proposal but imposed a flat rate of tax,8 4 some observers speculated
that the attempt to introduce progressivity was "the crucial issue in
controversy between opposing proponents of sales and spendings
taxes."8 5 As a compromise, the graduated spendings tax fell flat.
According to one survey, business executives preferred "an out-and
out sales tax" to Morgenthau's hybrid proposal.8 6
Sales tax opponents were equally unsatisfied with Treasury's
progressive consumption tax compromise. Senator Robert La Follette,
a Progressive from Wisconsin, commented that while he appreciated
the objective of "trying to undo the regressive effects of a sales tax,"
the Treasury proposal did not go far enough. He noted in particular
the failure to allow a deduction for rent and medical expenses, two
items that loomed large in the budget of lower-income people.87 The
problem was that the proposal was neither fish nor fowl. The Wall
Street Journal described it as "an income tax walking about on its

80. See Albright, Sales Levy Proposed by Treasury, supra note 74.
81. PAUL, supra note 13, at 3 12.
82. Treasury Charts Effect of Surtax an One Group, supra note 75 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also complaining about the proposal's com
plexity were Senators Brown, Davis, Herring, Radcliffe, and Taft. See id.
84. The Victory tax imposed a flat rate tax with a deduction for certain forms of savings
and investing, such as payment of insurance premiums, repayment of debt, and purchase of
War Bonds. The intent was to refund the tax paid at the end of the war through the use of a
credit. See PAUL, supra note 13, at 289.
85. Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Federal Revenue Act of 1942, 36 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1069, 1080-81 n.9 (1942).
86. Taxes Are Eased on Scarce Metals, supra note 78.
87. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, supra note 72.
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hands." 88 La Follette, perhaps sensing that the more unpalatable sales
tax alternative was gaining favor, attempted to improve the proposal
by introducing an amendment to add additional deductions, but the
motion failed.89
c.

1995

Although the progressive consumption tax concept experienced a
brief renaissance in the 1970s,90 it was not formally proposed again
until the mid-1990s. At that time, no fewer than eight plans to radi
cally change the existing federal income tax system were proposed.9 1
Tax reform even became a central issue during the 1996 presidential
campaign, with a flat tax, backed by Steve Forbes and House Majority
Leader Dick Armey (R-Tx.), and a national retail sales tax, advocated
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tx.), taking center stage.9 2 While
the details of each of the major proposals differed, they were linked by
a desire to move from an income to a consumption tax base.
The USA Tax was a bipartisan response to the rush to adopt some
form of flat rate consumption tax. It had been under development for
at least three years,9 3 but was not introduced until tax reform became
an issue in the 1996 campaign. As Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
acknowledged, "there are already two other proposals to completely
replace the current income tax code being discussed - a flat tax and a
national sales tax . . . . [W]e are introducing this legislation today to
make sure that our proposal is fully included in this important national
debate."9 4
Under the USA Tax, the current income tax would be supple
mented with an unlimited deduction for savings and investment.9 5
When combined with personal exemptions and a "family living allow
ance" similar to the standard deduction, a family of four's first $17,600
of consumption would be exempt from tax.9 6 Excess spending would
be subject to a progressive tax with three graduated rates ranging from
88. PAUL, supra note 13, at 312.
89. See id. The amendment was defeated eight to four, whereas the proposal had ini
tially been voted down on a unanimous twelve to zero vote. Id.
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977)
(suggesting the progressive consumption tax as one alternative for reform of the current in
come tax).
91. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, supra note 1, at 329.
92. Id. at 329-30.
93. See LAURENCE SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX 1 1 (1997).
94. 141 CONG. REC. 1 1 ,227 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
95. Id. at 1 1,228 (statement of Sen. Nunn).
96. Id. (statement of Sen. Nunn).
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nineteen percent to forty percent, plus a credit for payroll taxes.97 In
addition to this "household consumption tax," the sponsors of the
USA Tax also proposed replacing the corporate income tax with an
eleven-percent value added tax on business purchases.98
Once again, the USA Tax concept enjoyed significant scholarly
support. In addition to Princeton economist David Bradford, who had
authored the Treasury Department study recommending a similar tax
in 1977 and whose ideas were influential in the development of the
concept,99 the proposal emerged from a Center for Strategic Studies
commission staffed by academics and policymakers.00
1 As McCaffery
notes, however, in attempting to be more appealing as a political com
promise, the USA Tax sacrificed some ideological consistency (pp. 6061). First, it failed to include borrowing in income (p. 58). A taxpayer
could pay for consumption with borrowed funds and deduct salary as
savings, leaving the taxpayer owing no tax (p. 59). Professor Alvin
Warren commented that this "permits deferral of taxation beyond the
date of consumption" and creates a timing mismatch that could be
important if the graduated rates change between borrowing and
repayment. 10 1 Second, the USA Tax failed to repeal the estate and gift
taxes. As Laurence Seidman pointed out, "anyone who believes that
each person should be taxed according to what he actually withdraws
from the economic pie should . . . support the termination of estate
and gift taxes because these transfers of wealth do not entail any ac
tual consumption."1 0 2
As with its predecessors, the. USA Tax was never seriously consid
ered. 1 0 3 In addition to its ideological inconsistencies, the original bill
was deemed "overly complicated."10 4 The USA Tax bill, just like
Treasury's graduated spendings tax proposal in 1942, was written to
provide answers for all potential questions. As a result, Senators Nunn
and Domenici introduced 291 pages of proposed statutory changes.10 5
97. Id. at 11 ,228-29 (statement of Sen. Nunn).
98. Id. (statement of Sen. Nunn).
99. See id. at 1 1 ,233 (statement of Sen. Nunn); U.S. TREASURY DEPT, supra note 90.
1 00. See SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 1 1 .
101. Alvin C . Warren, Jr., The Proposal for a n 'Unlimited Savings Allowance,' 68 TAX
NOTES 1103, 1 108 (1995); see SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 142.
102. SEIDMAN, supra note 93, at 58.
103. The bill was never voted on by either the House or the Senate. Murray Weidenbaum, The Fundamental Internet Tax Debate, 24 WASH. Q. 41, 51 (2001 )
·

.

104. Bradley D. Belt, Wedding Bills; The Best Solution Will Marry Elements of Com
peting Tax Plans, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1996, at C3; see Robert A. Rankin, Tax Reform,
Anyone? Fairness Debate Grows as Frustration Climbs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June
2, 1996, at lL.
105. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT
WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 215 (1999).
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This provided an unmistakable target for critics of the bill. Professor
Ronald Pearlman explained that while "it is easier to envisage the
USA Tax as enacted legislation ...one of the prices of more details is
more devils, and one of the devils in the USA Tax is the substantial
degree of complexity resulting from the Unlimited Savings Allowance
and the retention of certain present-law business tax rules." 1 06
Professors Alvin Warren and Marty ·Ginsburg each examined the
operation of the tax under the bill's provisions and found it to be more
complicated and more susceptible to evasion than advertised.107 For
both sales and flat tax proponents, this complexity was fatal to the
bill's chances.
In addition to its complexity, for many the USA Tax failed to
deliver on its claims of fairness. As one commentator observed, it was
simply too bipartisan to get adopted in "today's polarized environ
ment. The Left still would rather attempt, however futilely, to soak the
rich the old-fashioned way, while the Right is enraptured with the flat
tax." 108 Even if they accepted a consumption rather than an income tax
base as a fair mode of taxation, supporters of the progressive income
tax considered the USA Tax unacceptable. This was in part because
the bill's top marginal rate of 40 percent kicked in at the compara
tively modest income level of $29,000 for a married couple.109 Thus,
they charged that the proposal retained the regressivity of the other
consumption tax proposals.11 ° For flat tax and sales tax supporters, the
problem was that the proposal deviated from the ideal of a single rate
and it failed to lower the burden for the top marginal rate taxpayers.111
The bill's sponsors and its proponents attempted to modify it in
response to these complaints. A year after it was introduced, Senator
Domenici proposed to reduce the top rate from forty to thirty percent
and eliminate the middle bracket.112 This would nudge the bill closer to
rates proposed under the flat tax bills. Although he conceded that the
USA Tax "is more complicated and less understood than its chief
106. Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh From the River Styx: The Achilles' Heels of Tax Reform
Proposals, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 569, 573 (1998) (citations omitted).
107. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax: Some Thoughts
on Working, Saving, and Consuming in Nunn-Domenici's Tax World, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 585
(1995); Warren, supra note 101, at 1 103.
108. James P. Pinkerton, Big Government and Other Taxing Matters, WASH. POST, Mar.
17, 1996, at X04.
109. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate
and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197, 200 (1999); Belt, supra note 104.
1 10. See Rankin, supra note 104. This ignored the credit provided for the payroll tax,
which, as McCaffery notes, is one of the most regressive (as well as one of the most signifi
cant) taxes in the revenue system. Pp. 17-19.
lll. See Belt, supra note 104.

Al.

1 12. See David Staats, Savings Key to New Tax Plan, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 2, 1996, at
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rival, the flat tax," he did not offer any concrete suggestions for its
simplification.113
In each of the last several sessions of Congress, Representative
Phil English (R-Pa.) has introduced the Simplified USA Tax Act in
response to the perceived complexity of the Nunn-Domenici
version.114 One noted feature of his bill is that it replaces the unlimited
deduction for savings with an unlimited Roth IRA. Although this
strays from the original cash-flow consumption tax notion, it elimi
nates the need for the complicated transition rules in the USA Tax bill
designed to address the "old savings" problem. 115 Simply put, this
problem exists where a wealthy individual could spend from pre-USA
Tax savings while depositing new income in their savings account,
effectively consuming large amounts with zero tax liability, which the
Nunn-Domenici bill countered with extensive transition rules. In addi
tion, English's plan proposes to reduce the rates along the lines of
those originally suggested by Domenici. Thus, under the Simplified
USA Tax, the rates would range from a low of 15% on taxable income
less than $40,000 to a high of 30% on taxable income in excess of
$80,000. 116 Despite these and other responses to the principal criticisms
of the USA Tax, 117 the Simplified USA Tax has never received serious
consideration in Congress.
Ill.

ASSESSING THE MCCAFFERY PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF HISTORY

McCaffery's proposal differs from previous incarnations of the
progressive consumption tax. The 1921 and 1942 proposals contem
plated supplementing, rather than replacing, the income tax. 118 The
USA Tax proposed to repeal the income tax, but excluded borrowing
from the base and retained the estate and gift tax. The primary
obstacles to the adoption of these earlier proposals, however, were
unrelated to these differences. Each proposal appeared too complex
1 13. Id.
1 14. See Simplified USA Tax Act of 2003, H.R. 269, 108th Cong. (2003); Simplified
USA Tax Act of 2001, H.R. 86, 107th Cong. (2001); Simplified USA Tax Act of 1 999, H.R.
134, 106th Cong. (1999).
1 15. See Business Coalition's Praise for Simplified USA Tax, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY,
200-29 (1998) (press release from American Business Conference).
1 16. See Simplified USA Tax Act of 1 999, H.R. 134, § 15(a) (describing tax rates for
married individuals filing joint returns).
1 17. It also eliminates the VAT tax on businesses and repeals the estate and gift tax. See
Karen Macpherson, Simpler U.S. Tax, Child Support Break Proposed, PITISBURGH POST
GAZETIE, Oct. 3, 1998, at A15.
1 18. See Adams, supra note 10, at 539. Some might argue that this demonstrates that in
1921 and 1 942 the income tax system was not "broken " in the same sense as today. This
ignores the views of contemporary legislators. In each case, legislators believed the income
tax was fundamentally flawed and in need of radical reform or replacement. See supra text
accompanying notes 10-12, 40-42.

May 2003 ]

The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited

2255

and was considered inequitable either because it used a progressive
rate or failed to include income in the base. The question is whether
McCaffery's proposal overcomes these hurdles.
A. Complexity
In Fair Not Flat, McCaffery's most savvy gambit on the complexity
issue has been to limit the details of his proposal. Unlike in 1942 and
1995, when the extensive progressive consumption tax proposals were
susceptible to opponents' criticisms regarding the proposal's apparent
complexity, Fair Not Flat is more a description of the concept than the
details. As McCaffery writes, "I will not . . . add[] fuel to think-tank
fires. Complexity can wait. The devil may indeed dwell in the details,
but we first need to find an angel or two in.the abstractions that gov
ern tax"(pp. 6-7). Even where.he provides details, he does not commit
to them like his predecessors did in 1942 and 1995.
While it is fair to permit McCaffery to outline his proposal before
scrutinizing the details, it is equally . fair to demand that he provide or
commit to some details before permitting him to proclaim the simplic
ity of his proposal. For example, throughout the book McCaffery
carefully avoids deciding whether to replace the bottom brackets of
the progressive consumption tax with a sales tax or a VAT. The two
are not interchangeable. He may prefer the VAT, but recognizing that
"the phrase 'value-added tax' has been the political death knell for
consumption tax proposals,"119 he refuses to embrace it. McCaffery
even calls this aspect of the proposal "optional," which would negate
the simplicity advantages of relieving lower-income taxpayers from
filing a return (p. 138).
In a perhaps more serious omission, McCaffery offers little insight
as to what the taxation of business would look like under his proposal.
He acknowledges that "there are good reasons to consider . . . elimi
nating" business taxes, but he reminds the reader that "I haven't
addressed business taxes in this book" (p. 125-26). He thus fails to
offer any alternatives to our current corporate tax scheme. Some
speculate that he would use the VAT to replace the corporate income
tax, which is what Nunn and Domenici proposed in their 1995 USA
Tax Act bill.1 2 0 By not committing, however, McCaffery's claim to
simplicity is tenuous. If he concedes that maintaining the status quo
with respect to the tax structure would be necessary to secure passage
of his proposal, his progressive consumption tax would suffer from
some of the same inconsistency that he derides under our current

1 1 9. GRAETZ, supra note 105, at 308.
1 20. See Laurence Seidman, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Sim
pler, 96 TAX NOTES 1 409, 1412 (2002) (book review).
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hybrid system.121 It may be less inconsistent than the current system,
but not necessarily less than other reform proposals.
McCaffery's problem is that the progressive consumption tax
does not appear simple on its face. The tax connects two seemingly
incongruous concepts - progressivity and a consumption tax - and
does so using the existing structure. Although there is a tendency to
"oversell the gain in simplicity" from adopting a sales tax, 1 2 2 it is
presumed to be less complex than the current system. Progressive
consumption tax proponents have historically borne the burden of
establishing that their proposal would not introduce a new brand of
complexity. It is not clear that the omission of details will help carry
that burden.
B.

Fairness

Unlike the complexity objection, Mccaffery directly addresses
concerns about the equity of his proposal, emphasizing that "fairness
is the most important element of a good tax system" (p. 40). He
recognizes, however, that the fairness of the progressive consumption
tax concept is not immediately apparent to either side in the tax
reform debate: "I have few fully committed allies in my quest for a
better, fairer tax system," McCaffery explains (p. 94). "My liberal
friends ... typically object to the idea of consumption taxes. My
conservative friends typically object to the idea of progressive rates"
(p. 94). McCaffery's failure to overcome these objections to base and
to rate, respectively, is in part because he compares his proposal to the
imperfect current system rather than the idealized system imagined by
supporters of other reform proposals.
1.

Base

According to McCaffery, the real problem with the fairness of an
income tax or a prepaid consumption tax such as a wage or payroll tax
is that it concentrates the heaviest taxation during the midlife years (p.
16). This exaggerates an individual's ability to pay by ignoring the
need to save for retirement in nonearning years. By contrast, a pro
gressive consumption tax more smoothly distributes the burdens of
taxation over an individual's lifetime by only imposing a tax when
income is actually spent (p. 17). This timing concern may be mitigated
to some extent by the very inconsistencies McCaffery derides in the
121. For example, if he maintains the current system of business taxation while subject
ing all other income to the progressive consumption tax, corporate income would be taxed
currently, but partnership and other investment income would not because that income is
tied to the individual tax system.
122. See Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and Corporate Responsibility, 96 TAX NOTES
1523, 1528 (2002).
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current system, such as tax-deferred pension plans and individual
retirement accounts. Nevertheless, the progressive consumption tax
would surely push us further toward the ideal consumption tax.
McCaffery anticipates some of the major objections that have been
raised by income tax supporters. One is that a consumption tax is
regressive because lower-income people consume a larger percentage
of their income than do rich people. McCaffery suggests that the pro
gressive consumption tax addresses that concern, but his primary re
sponse is that his proposal is much more effective than the status quo
at taxing the rich (p. 40). A variety of features permit the rich to avoid
the high marginal rates under our current system, including the failure
to tax unrealized appreciation and the ability to borrow tax-free
against that appreciation.
A second objection is that a consumption tax leaves savings and
income from savings out of the tax base. Since these resources
contribute to a taxpayer's ability to pay, their omission creates an
inequity between wage earners and wealthy savers. Moreover, permit
ting this capital to grow tax-free would allow the wealthy to become
too powerful. Once again, McCaffery's principal response is that the
status quo is worse (p. 40). While unrealized appreciation goes
untaxed, the one form of savings that is consistently taxed under the
current system - interest from bank accounts - is the form of savings
most likely to be held by the middle and lower classes (p. 40).
Furthermore, he suggests that if we assume progressive rates, the
progressive consumption tax is a more effective indirect tax on capital
than an income tax, although it is only imposed at the point of spend
ing (p. 40). Even if this latter point · is convincing to income tax sup
porters, it is likely to alienate flat tax proponents who seek to reduce
the burden on capital.
McCaffery's responses are likely unpersuasive because he com
pares the consumption tax to the imperfect status quo rather than the
perfect system imagined by income tax supporters. While his proposal
is not completely free from imperfections,1 2 3 it likely would be an
improvement. Nevertheless, the current system is not the only alterna
tive to a consumption tax. Income tax supporters . don't accept the
failings of the current system as evidence of the need to switch to a
consumption tax. For example, progressive income tax proponents
considered Ogden Mills's argument that the wealthy evaded taxes
anyway to be a strange argument for shifting to a tax base that
primarily benefited the wealthy.1 2 4
123. For example, by not taxing gifts in a graduated marginal rate consumption tax,
wealthy taxpayers whose heavy consumption predated the tax can give away cash to their
children who can spend at a lower rate. This might be better than the current system, but it
undercuts the progressivity of the tax.
1 24. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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McCaffery has proposed some measures to address income tax
supporters' concerns, but these make his proposal more unpalatable
for consumption tax proponents. For example, under his proposal the
trust accounts would be subject to two rules. First, he would impose
a "loose diversification requirement on investments in the Trust
Accounts . . . [to] prevent the accounts from developing concentrated
power within particular markets or industries" (p. 147-48). Second, he
would prevent individuals from lobbying or running for office (a la
Ross Perot) using funds in the trust accounts (p. 148). These rules may
assuage income tax proponents' fear of unchecked sources of power,
but only at the expense of consumption tax supporters who have no
desire for government oversight of their money.
2.

Rate

McCaffery acknowledges that "[c]onservative objections to pro
gressive rates are not as easily answered as liberal concerns about
consumption taxes" (p. 94). He notes that recent flat tax proposals
were progressive because their exemptions were equivalent to zero
rate brackets (p. 87). This exemption reflected the principal that
spending on ordinary consumer items should be taxed more than
bare necessities (p. 88). If this is true, then it follows that spending on
luxuries should be taxed more than spending on ordinary consumer
items (p. 89). He argues that this line of analysis - based on the
notion that higher levels of spending are less essential than lower
levels - is easier to justify than the traditional notion that higher lev
els of income are less essential than lower levels (p. 87).
As with his arguments in favor of the consumption base,
McCaffery's justification for progressivity is based on a comparison
with the current system. In other words, McCaffery argues that if we
want progressivity, it is more defensible in the context of a consump
tion tax than an income tax. Flat tax supporters, however, don't accept
the initial premise that tax rates should be progressive. Moreover,
McCaffery's additional arguments that other regressive measures such
as payroll, state, and local taxes will cut against the progressivity of his
proposal (pp.94-95), and that estate tax repeal will benefit the wealthy
(p. 95), do not depend upon adoption of a progressive consumption
tax.
IV.

CONCLUSION

McCaffery is a passionate advocate for the progressive consump
tion tax and Fair Not Flat is the most lucid and persuasive account yet
written for its adoption. Nevertheless, if history is any guide,
McCaffery's proposal is still unlikely to garner substantial support, at
least as a complete package. Notwithstanding its progressive rate, it
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fails to directly include savings in the tax base and thus appears to
violate progressive income tax advocates' notions of ability to pay. It
also discards the flat rate principle that is responsible for much of its
appeal among flat and sales tax advocates. Because of these multiple
dependent variables, satisfying one group is likely to upset another
and, in any event, it is difficult to resolve all such concerns while main
taining the appearance of simplicity. Perhaps this is a failing of all
fundamental tax reform proposals, but in that case it is appropriate to
acknowledge that the progressive consumption tax is indeed a funda
mental tax reform proposal rather than the compromise it often claims
to be.
After eighty years, it may be time for progressive consumption tax
advocates themselves to consider a compromise. One possibility is
Professor Michael Graetz's proposal to combine a 10-15 percent sales
tax with a 20-25 percent flat-rate income tax for income in excess of
between $75,000 and $100,000.1 25 The advantage of this proposal is
that it maintains both the progressivity and income tax base that
progressive income tax supporters seek while replacing a large part of
the income tax with the flat rate income and sales taxes that consump
tion tax supporters desire.1 2 6 Graetz calls this the "Back to the Future"
tax reform because it would return us to the pre-World War II era
when the income tax only affected a small, but wealthy, segment of the
population and served as a progressive counterweight to the regressive
consumption taxes.
This combination income and sales tax would be more faithful to
the original vision of a hybrid tax. When the first post-Sixteenth
Amendment income tax was adopted in 1913, it was considered a
supplement to the tariff-based consumption taxes that made up the
bulk of federal revenues.1 27 The combination of the two types of taxes
appealed to many contemporary observers on fairness grounds. As
James Duncan of the American Federation of Labor noted in 1921,
whatever inequalities appear in the two systems, the income tax and the
sales tax, as against the rich or the poor, I feel that these inequalities tend
to disappear when both systems are put in operation .... One tends to
counteract the defects of the other, and both, working together, strike a
just balance, or as near just as we are likely to make it.128

Although McCaffery rejects Graetz's plan for its failure to settle
on a consistent, comprehensive, tax base (p. 102), it is distinguishable
125. See GRAETZ, supra note 105, at 265.
126. While the income tax portion of the tax would be flat-rate, the tax would be pro
gressive because of the huge exemption.
127. See Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, supra note 1, at 388-97.
128. S. Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 10, at 159-60 (brief of
Felix Vorenberg, representing Mass. Retail Merchants' Ass'n together with Newspaper
Comment) (quoting from Boston Post, Mar. 25, 1 921 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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from the hybrid income tax we have today. Our current system's mix
of income and consumption taxes is based on a variety of ad hoc tax
policies and principles, encrusted from years of contradictory and
conflicting decisions. By contrast, the original hybrid was a deliberate
decision to utilize different tax bases for different segments of the
population. Consumption taxes failed to reach accumulated wealth
and imposed a regressive burden on the poor and middle class. The
progressive income tax, with its substantial exemption, was capable of
balancing that burden without forcing the bulk of the population onto
the income tax rolls. Perhaps McCaffery is right that the original
hybrid arrangement broke down with the introduction of a realization
requirement in 1920 (p. 29), but this has long since disappeared as a
constitutional requirement.129 The realization requirement may be
easier to phase out completely if its effect is limited to a relatively
small segment of the population. In any event, a compromise between
the two modes of taxation may not only return the federal revenue
system to its historical roots, but it may be the best hope for moving
toward the ideal of a fair not flat tax. 1 30

1 29. See Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, supra note 41, at 78-79 & n.489;
Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 792 (1941) (arguing that the Court's decision in Hel
vering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 ( 1 940), overturned the constitutional requirement for realiza
tion the Court announced in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)). But see Henry
Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark
to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1 , 99 (1 993) (arguing that the constitutional requirement still
exists).
130. Graetz recently commented that McCaffery's proposed modifications of the USA
Tax "would move it considerably closer to" his proposal. See Michael J. Graetz, 1 00 Million
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 261, 283 n. 109
(2002).

